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IN THE SUPREME, COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
ERWIN MOTZKUS and LUCILLE 
110TZKUS, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
:MARVIN CARROLL ,and ELVA 
DWEEN CARROLL, his wife, and 
MRS. KEMPTON, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, Trustee for Carl M. 
Hansen, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8706 
Respondents Motzkus were purchasing from Re-
spondent Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company under 
a real estate contract (Exs. P-1, P-2) the tract of land 
described in the Complaint, the property to be used for 
a motel (R. 25). Appellant Ken1pton was selling to Ap-
pellants Carroll under .a real estate contract (Ex. D-24) 
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the property to the South of the Motzkus property. The 
location of said two tracts of land with reference to each 
other is shown by one of the several surveys made of 
the properties (Ex. P-17). 
On August 17, 1953, shortly after executing the said 
contract, ::t'Yiotzkus had the property surveyed (R. 26) and 
commenced construction of B"nit No. 1 (the North unit) 
of his motel. A subsequent survey obtained by Mr. Motz-
kus in 1955, from which Exhibit P-17 was prepared, 
showed the same boundaries as did the original August 
survey (R. 73). At the time the August survey was being 
made the apparent owner of the property to the South 
of the ~fotzkus property, in a conversation with Mr. 
_jfac Kessler, the surveyor for _jfotzkus, stated that she 
knew her house was situate on the Motzkus property (R. 
72). 
In ~farch, 1954, (R. 30) llrs. Kempton was shown 
by Motzkus the boundary and at this time she made no 
objection to it. Thereafter in September of 1954 (R. 27), 
~lotzkus commenced construction of Unit No. 2, locating 
it about -!feet North of the .surveyed boundary in order 
that he would have space to work to the South behind 
the unit (R. :27, 39, 40). 
During the construction of Unit X o. 2, Mrs. Kempton 
informed l\lotzkus that he could remove some old fence 
posts and ·wire which were South of his rnit No.2 build-
ing being constructed, indicating that the posts were on 
the Motzkus property (R. 54, 62). 1\lrs. Ke1npton had 
been living on the property all during the time of the 
construction of the n1otel and had at no time objected 
to the survl'YPd boundary (R. 30). 
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In June, 1955, Mrs. Kempton had a .survey made 
showing the common boundaries of the property (R. 34, 
35), which boundaries were the same as those shown by 
the Motzkus survey (R. 34, 74, 154). Shortly thereafter 
she sold all of her interest in the property to Carrolls 
(R. 123), Carroll knowing at this tune of the surveyed 
boundary line ( R. 45). 
Thereafter, Carroll on various occasions erected 
steel posts, wooden posts and installed b.arbed wire, 
graded the property up to the steel posts and erected a 
shed. This together with threats against the 11otzkuses 
effectively kept 1Iotzkus off the property lying South of 
the fence erected by Carroll (R. 37, 44, 45, 51, 14-l:) (Exs. 
P-6, P-7). These acts of Mr. Carroll were committed even 
though he stated that he did not know where the bound-
ary was and claimed that he did not own the fence (R. 
143). 
There is indication of old fence posts .and some old 
wire running in a crooked line Easterly and Westerly 
somewhere near the surveyed boundary (R. 155). There 
is no evidence, however, to show when the posts were 
erected, by whom they were erected, why they were 
erected or at what points along the properties the posts 
were situate. 
l\Irs. Mildred Lee Flannigan, predecessor in interest 
of the Appellants, sold all of her interest in the pro:1erty 
to Mrs. Kempton (R. 104 and 105). Mrs. Kempton sold 
all of her interest to the Carrolls, using the same descrip-
tion as w.as used in the McCleary-Flannigan transaction 
and the Flannigan-Kempton transaction (R. 12~). There 
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are no conveyances by any of the Appellants or their 
predecessors in title varying the legal description shown 
on Exhibits D-24 and P-17. There have been no convey-
ances by any of these people of any property North of 
the described boundary line. There have been no convey-
,ances by the Respondents or their predecessors in title 
to any of the Appellants or their predecessors in title of 
any of the property lying North of the described bound-
ary line. 
The Respondents Motzkus brought this action to 
quiet title against Appellants Kempton and Carroll, 
claiming and proving title to the property described in 
the Complaint and .shown on Exhibit P-17. The Appel-
lants defended, claiming that there was an old fence line 
lying within the Motzkus property which was a boundary 
line by acquiescence and that the Appellants were en-
titled to that additional piece of property lying North 
of their described boundary line up to the alleged bound-
ary line by acquiescence. From the judgment in favor 
of Respondents, Appellants have appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellants in their brief have raised two points: 
(.a) The sufficiency of the evidence in its applica-
tion to the Findings of Fact; and, 
(b) The sufficiency of the conclusion that no bound-
ar? b~· acquiescence wa8 established. These points are 
an ~we red under the following two points by Respondents. 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
(a) TESTIMONY OF APPELLANTS' WITNESSES 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS. 
(b) RESPONDENTS' AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE SUP-
PORTS THE FINDINGS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT IS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT NO 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE WAS ESTABLISHED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
(a) TESTIMONY OF APPELLANTS' WITNESSES 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS. 
Appellants have summarized the most favorable 
points in their witnesses' testimony in attempting to 
indicate that there is no evidence whatsoever to support 
the court's decision. It is well settled, however, that if 
there is reasonable evidence from which the court can 
arrive at its Findings, then a conflict in the evidence will 
not justify the Appellate Court's reversal of the trial 
court's Findings of Fact. 
Let us examine portions of the testimony of the facts 
of the Appellants' witnesses, which witnesses were be-
fore the court so that their demeanor and credibility 
could be examined, both on direct and cross examination. 
Excerpts from these witnesses' testimonies are herein-
after set forth in the order in which said witnesses are 
discussed in Appellants' brief: 
VERL STATEN 
Mr. Staten stated that there was no fence near the 
motel building. He was only familiar with an old fence 
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1n the Easterly portion of the property and was not 
certain as to where that fence was with reference to the 
property lines (R. 88). He first thought there was 
barbed wire and metal posts (R. 88). Thereafter he was 
not sure whether there was wire or not, or whether there 
were metal posts. Through leading questions by Judge 
Stump, the witness was able to say that the fence had 
been there for the last 45 years (R. 84). He did not know 
who had erected the fence. 
AMBER PATTERSON 
Mrs. Patterson testified that she had not paid any 
attention to the fence or its location for the last two 
ye.ars (R. 92). She did not know on whose property the 
fence was situate and could not say any more than there 
was a fence between the house and the motel. She didn't 
say where the fence was located (R. 93). She gave no 
testimony as to any fence along the Easterly part of the 
property. 
FRANCIS McCLEARY 
Mrs. McClearly lived .a block away fron1 the proper-
ties and was not familiar with any fences or with the 
property since 1940 (R. 95). She did n1ention a fence 
between the house and the n1otel for a period of 13 
months in 1925 (R. 97). but did not know on whose 
property the fence was situate (R. 98). 
MILDRED LEE FLANNIGAN 
_l\lrs. Flannigan was an original owner of the prop-
erty, having sold out to :Mrs. K_en1pton in 1951. She had 
not been back ~ince that time (R. 103). She had sold all 
of lwr property to ~I r~. I\::en1pton which she had acquired 
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frorn l\frs. :McCleary. There had never been any question 
about the property line and she did not know what fence, 
if any, was still there. 
LAWRENCE J. COX 
Mr. Cox was familiar with a fence in the Easterl.v 
part of the property, but after 1953 did not go on the 
property at all (R. 111). He did not know on whose 
property the fence was situate (R. 113). 
CECILIA L. SPRINGMAN 
l\irs. Springman stated that there was no fence 
between the Carrolls and the ~lotzkus property, but that 
she had not been on the property for more than a year 
(R. 115, 117). A fence had been repaired and then torn 
down but she did not know where the property line was 
(R. 119). 
RUTH KEMPTON 
l\{rs. Ken1pton testified that she sold her interest 
in the property to Carroll in 1955 ( R. 123). She did not 
know where the property line was (R. 124) and just took 
for granted that the olcl fence posts were on the line (R. 
124). She stated that the fence did not belong to her (R. 
123), thus indicating that she did not know or had not 
made any effort to determine where the line was. 
In summing up the testimony of the Appellants' 
witnesses, it would appear that most of them had not 
observed the premises recently in from one to ten years, 
depending upon the particular witness. Most testified 
that a fence of some kind had existed in years gone by, 
but none of them indicated that .a fence between the house 
and the motel was in any way connected with a fence 
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on the Ea.sterly portion of the property. None of them 
knew who put the fence up nor why the fence was erected. 
None knew whether the fence was on one side of the 
boundary line or on the other and there was no testimony 
indicating that the fence had any relationship to the true 
boundary line. The testimony of these witnesses did not 
indicate anything more than that some kind of an old 
fence had existed in the vicinity of the boundaries of the 
two properties in years gone by; where it was, no one 
knew. W a.s it on the surveyed line, was it to the North 
thereof or to the South~ 
There is no evidence of a definite fence line existing 
between the motel and the Kempton house other than a 
recent fence or a few posts which were taken down by 
~Ir. Motzkus. Even disregarding the cross-examination 
of Appellants' witnesses and looking only to their direct 
exarnination in the most f.avorable light available to Ap-
pellants, there is no evidence of an established fence line 
during the last few years which could be considered to 
have been acquiesced in by the parties. The only wit-
nesses who could acquiesce as to this alleged fence linP 
have either not known where the boundary was or have 
expressly rejected any theory of acquiescence. These 
persons .are Mrs. Flannigan, l\Irs. l{empton, and Mr. 
Carroll. The other witnesses testifying on behalf of Ap-
pellants were persons who n1erely observed from time to 
time that there were old fence posts or was an old fence. 
The testimony of these people can hardly be determina-
tive of acquiescence by the parties on either side of a 
boundary line. 
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(b) RESPONDENTS AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE SUP-
PORTS THE FINDINGS. 
To determine what additional evidence the Court 
considered in arriving at its decision, let us now ex-
amine the testimony of the Respondents and the Re-
spondents' witness, Thlr. M:ack Kessler. 1v1r. Th1otzkus 
purchased the property in July, 1953 and he thereafter 
had his first survey made sometime in August, 1953 (R. 
26). At the time the survey was made, the Appellant, 
Mrs. ICempton, was shown where the boundaries were 
between the Kempton property and the Motzkus property 
(R. 30). From that time forward until June of 1954 when 
unit No. 2 was con.structed, Mrs. Kempton knew of the 
boundary of the properties as shown by the survey (R. 
30), had a survey made of her own (R. 34), watched a 
second survey r11ade by Thir. Kessler and watched Mr. 
Motzkus construct unit No. 2 of his motel without making 
any objection or without raising any question as to the 
boundary of the property as shown by the survey. 
When Mr. Kessler was making the second survey, 
he met a lady who apparently was Mrs. Kempton, coming 
out of the Kempton house. Mr. Kessler in .a conversation 
with her told her that the property line ran through the 
corner of her house (as is shown on Exhibit P -2), where-
upon Mrs. Kempton stated that she knew that was where 
the property line lay (R. 71, 72). During the month of 
June, 1954, Mr. Motzkus approached Mrs. Kempton con-
cerning the removal of a wire fence lying somewhere 
South of the proposed South wall of unit No. 2, where-
upon Mr.s. Kempton stated that the fence was not her's 
and that Mr. Motzkus could take it down (R. 54, 62). 
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The foregoing testimony indicates that :Mrs. Kemp-
ton, the Appellant, did not consider any old fence posts 
as the true boundary between the Kempton and the 
Motzkus property. It must be noted that Mr. Carroll, 
a contract purchaser from :Mrs. Kempton, could claim no 
more than that which l\frs. Kempton agreed to sell him 
under the contract. Counsel for Appellants have argued 
that Mrs. Kempton could not convey her interest in 
the property by an oral disclaimer. vVe do not maintain 
that l\irs. Kempton did make such a conveyance, since 
she did not own the property. We merely contend that 
~i[rs. Kempton, as the fee title owner, did not consider 
the alleged fence as a boundary line and that there could 
not be as a matter of fact a boundary by acquiescenc?. 
~Irs. Kempton only acquired the prope1iy bounded by 
the surveyed description. She did not acquire property 
extending into the Motzkus property and up to the al-
leged fence line. Therefore, she did not attempt to convey 
anything contrary to the Statute of Frauds by an indica-
tion that she did not believe the alleged fence line to be 
the boundary. 
The foregoing testimony indicates that ~Irs. Kemp-
ton had a survey made, knew where the boundaries were 
and acquiesced therein by: (a) her state1nent to ~Ir. 
Kessler; (b) her statement to l\Ir. ~[otzkus to remoYe 
the \ V esterly portion of a wire fence~ (c) her being 
present on the property at .all tin1es while ~Ir. :\Iotzkus 
was constructing the 1notel and using the property South 
of the wire fence; (d) and her failure to object to the 
surveyed boundary. There is no doubt but what there 
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was sufficient affirmative evidence to establish that 
even though there may have been an old fence or old 
fence posts during past years, that the present property 
owners did not consider said fence to be the true bound-
ary between the ~1:otzkus and the Kempton properties. 
\V e next should consider the documentary evidence 
adduced by Respondents: An abstract of Title showing 
that for many years the property was described in the 
same Inanner as is described in the Complaint and in the 
Real Estate Contract between Zion's Savings Bank & 
Trust Company .and ~lotzkus; a surveyor's plat by a 
registered surveyor showing the actual relationship of 
the _Motzkus and the Kempton properties, concerning 
which survey there is no dispute and which coincides 
with the public records and plats of the county recorder 
and surveyor (R. 75-80) the contract existing between 
Appellant Kempton and Appellant Carroll showing 
the property to be situate South of the Motzkus property. 
All of these documents go to show that the record title of 
both pieces of property has long since been established. 
In view of these facts, Carroll could not acquire any 
property or rights therein lying North of the surveyed 
boundary. Likewise, ~Irs. Kempton could not acquire 
any land lying North of this description; -~\Irs. Flannigan 
could not acquire any land lying North of this descrip-
tion; and l\[rs. McCleary could not acquire any land 
lying X orth of this description. The deeds simply did not 
convey said property and there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that the deeds, contracts or any other convey-
ances ever attempted to convey property lying North 
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of the surveyed boundary line. There were surveys made 
reaffirming the boundary description in 1953 and 1955 
and no contention is made by Appellants that the surveys 
are erroneous in any respect. Rather, Appellants can 
only argue that the surveys and the deeded descriptions 
are not determinative of the North boundary of the 
Kempton property, and that an alleged old fence line 
supposedly lying several feet North of the boundary js 
the true Northern property line. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT IS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT NO 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE WAS ESTABLISHED. 
Having considered the facts under Point I above, 
we should now pass to the question of whether or not 
unde·r these facts construed most favorably in favor 
of Respondents, the Court should have determined that 
the described surveyed and platted boundaries of the 
two pieces of property should be ignored and a boundary 
established by an old fence line under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. In order to consider this 
point, we would have to assume for purposes of argument 
that the old fence posts have established a definite bound-
ary line from State Street on East between the 1notel 
buildings and the l{enlpton house .and further on East to 
the end of the property. 'y e would further have to as-
sume that the fence line wa.s accurately located .and ·was a 
definite and continuous and ea'Sily discernible fence line. 
Appellants rely on a line of Utah cases con1n1encing 
with Holmes v. Judge and apparently contend that said 
cases uniformly show that .an old fence no 1natter where 
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it lies, no matter why it was erected and no matter who 
erected it, establishes a boundary by acquie.scence. That 
position is the only position that Appellants can main-
tain construing the facts most favorably in their favor. 
Respondents submit that these cases do not so hold and 
that the other more applicable law of our Supreme Court 
does not so hold. Let us discus's these cases cited by 
Appellants. 
In Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, the general princi-
ple of boundaries by acquiescence is enunciated. The 
Court in addition to making the statements quoted by 
Appellants also adds a very important exception, ap-
plicable to our case at bar: 
"These rules, of course, have no application 
where a party buys with a view to lines estab-
lished by new or later surveys. As to such gr.ant-
ees, the new survey or lines whether right or 
wrong govern. This is so, however, because such 
a grantee bought and hi's deed is made with refer-
ence to the new lines and not because the estab-
lished boundaries may not be insisted on in all 
proper cases." 
Subsequent Utah cases have amplified and varied 
this very gener.al rule. Chief among these cases being 
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Ut. 267, 209 Pac. 2d 257. In this 
case the Court held that there must be some uncertainty 
or a dispute between adjoining land owners as to the 
location of the true boundary line before a fence may 
be considered as a boundary line by their acquiescence. 
In the Glenn case, the fence erected was not intended to 
settle any uncertainty or dispute between the litigants 
and the Court said: 
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"The mere fact that a fence happens to be 
put up and neither party doe~s anything about it 
for a long period of time will not establish it as 
the true boundary. Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 
89, 34 Pac. 2d 697; Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Ut. 57, 276 
Pac. 912, 69 A.L.R.1417." 
Appellant.s can only say, under the evidence most 
favorable to them, that a fence was put up and nothing 
was done about it for a long time. 
Again in the case of Tripp v. Bagley, supra, the 
Court pointed out that unless there is a dispute or an un-
certainty as to the boundary line, the subsequent erection 
of .a fence will not become a boundary by acquiescencP 
for the reason that such an agreement would be a derro-
gation from the Statute of Frauds. Parties cannot agreP 
to convey one to the other a portion of real property 
under the Statute of Frauds unless there is a dispute 
as to the boundaries and the .acquiescence an10unts to a 
settlement of the dispute. 
A later case of Hummel v. Young~ 1 rt. 2d 237, again 
upheld the rule concerning boundaries by acquiescence. 
In this case, the court said in holding there ,,-as no bound-
ary by acquiescence : 
"There is no rule in Yiew of the evidence ap-
pearing to in1ply that the fenre was built pursuant 
to .agreement between the adjoining owners. l\Ir. 
Young testified that he built the fence hi1nself 
in 1 !1:28 without consulting the adjoining owner. 
1\;[rs. Levitre, and that she did not liYe on her lot 
at that tin1e. Thus it would do violence to the 
evidence to in1ply an agree1nent here. In this re-
spcet this case is similar to H .0. L. r. Y. Dudley, 
supra: Peterson v. Johnson, supra; Glenn Y. 
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Whitney, supra; and Brown v. Mullner, supra. 
In the last cited case, the defendant testified that 
he built the fence which he relied upon .as the 
boundary without ever discussing the matter with 
the adjoining owner ... we held that in view 
of that testimony there was no rule to imply that 
the fence had been built pursuant to an agreement 
between the adjoining owners fixing the bound-
aries between them." 
Our Court again in the case of Smith v. Nelson, 197 
Pac. 2d 13~, 114 Ut. 51, held that there must be a bound-
ary dispute between adjoining property owners in order 
that the establishment of a fence be considered a bound-
ary by acquiescence. See also Jensen v. Bartlett, 4 Ut. 
2d 58, 286 Pac. 2d 804. This case holds that if there is 
no official or original plat or survey by which the bound-
ary line can be located and if the different surveyors 
do not agree on the location of the boundary line, then 
sufficient uncertainty is created on which to base a 
finding of a boundary line by acquiescence. In our case 
there is no question whatsoever as to the accuracy of the 
surveys, and the surveys, the plats .and the property 
descriptions are all indicative of the proper boundary 
location. Thus by negative implication, the Jensen v. 
Bartlett case rule would hold that in our case there is 
no uncertainty or dispute and thus there can be boundary 
by acquiescence. A complete review of the Utah c.ases 
is cited in the Jensen case and the Jensen case reaffirms 
the rule previously handed down that there must be an 
uncertainty or dispute in the boundary in order to have a 
boundary by acquiescence. 
Now in applying the law of the above cases to the 
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subject c.ase, the Court should note that there is no evi-
dence whatsoever adduced on behalf of the Appellant~ 
to show how, why, or by whom the fence was erected. 
As a matter of fact, the testimony does not indicate 
where the fence was erected. It might conceivably have 
been on the property line, it might have been on one 
side or the other of the property line and Mr. Kessler 
(R. 155, 156) states that the fence posts were in a very 
crooked line and in an .advanced state of disrepair. Can 
it be said, therefore, that Appellants have established 
a definite fence line, erected to settle some uncertainty 
or dispute, sufficient to disregard the established survey 
lines and old descriptions~ 
The photos introduced by Appellants show the fence 
and the adjoining properties after the Appellant Carroll 
had moved in, h.ad put up the various posts and had 
improved the property by grading and by son1e con-
struction South of the posts. Mr. Kessler indicated that 
the old fence consisted of 20 or less posts, crookedly 
located and in great disrepair. The posts were lying 
on the ground and were in various degrees of erection 
with an occasional strand of barbed wire. This type of 
fence does not appear to be a definite .and accurate 
boundary by acquiescence conte1nplated under our cases. 
Certainly if the parties were to rely upon a fence by 
acquiescence to deter1nine their boundary lines, they 
would maintain the fence in son1e sort of a state of repair 
and would atten1pt to effect, to s01ne degree at least, a 
straight boundary line. Such is not the case here. 
The parties who were interested in the actual prop-
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erty, although testifying that In a conversation with 
Mr. H·ansen, he indicated that the fence was to be re-
paired by him and that he w.as to plant flowers up to the 
fence line, still these parties did not know where the 
boundary line was but only assumed that it was some-
where along the old fence, wherever that might be. They 
had not taken the trouble to rook at the plats, abstracts, 
or surveys. 
Appellant attempted to show th.at other fence.s in 
the area had existed for a long period of time, but this 
fact is not material since under the Glenn v. Whitney 
case, supra, the Court said that other fences separating 
lands of other owners was no indication of the establish-
ment of .a particular boundary by a fence line. 
In order to have a boundary by acquiescence there 
must be: 
(a) A definite fence line e.stablished many years 
between two particular pieces of property; 
(b) There must be an acquiescence by both parties 
during this period agreeing that the fence line is a bound-
ary line; 
(c) There must have been an uncert.ainty or a 
dispute giving reason to the erection of the fence. 
As a matter of fact, according to the evidence, there (a) 
has not been a dispute or uncertainty giving rise to the 
erection of the fence; (b) there has not been a definite 
fence line which could be considered as a boundary line 
by acquiescence ; and, (c) there has not been .an acquies-
cence, since Mrs. McCle·arly, Mrs. Flannigan, Mrs. Kemp-
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ton and Mr. Carroll have all entered into contracts and 
deeds based upon a property description which did not 
coincide with any old fence line and which was repre-
sented on the ground as being different from the old 
fence. 
SUMMARY 
Appellants have argued that it is "incomprehensible 
how the trial court could find that the old fence line *** 
was not a boundary line by acquiescence ***." Appel-
lant.s in so arguing are attempting to overturn the facts 
as found by the lower court. These facts establish a 
boundary by plat, survey and long established lines of 
conveyances down through the predecessors of both 
parties. Mr. Carroll, whose only rights to this property 
are based on his contract, is attempting to reach beyond 
the boundaries of his contract and acquire additional 
property. 1Irs. Kempton is likewise atten1pting to reach 
beyond the described boundary of her deed to acquire 
property beyond. Respondents sub1nit that the facts 
found by the court cannot realistically support Appel-
lants' position. 
Acquiescence would seen1 to conten1plate at least 
tacit agree1nent by the parties as to a particular line. 
Acquiescence would also include son1e recognition of or 
reliance upon the alleged boundary line. Both of these 
factors are entirely lacking in Appellants' case. ~Irs. 
l{empton knew the surveyed boundaries of her property, 
knew that they did not extend to the alleged fence posts 
and not withstanding this knowledge, contracted to con-
vey all of her intPre~t in the property to ~r r. Carroll, 
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according to the surveyed description. This action is a 
summary of her understanding and the understanding of 
Carroll of the boundary limitations and in no way can 
it be said that these Appellants, nor their immediate 
predecessors, considered the old fence posts as the 
~ orth boundary of their property, as a matter of fact, 
or could have so considered as a matter of law. 
Respondents submit that the evidence is more than 
adequate to support the trial court's findings that the 
property descriptions are properly shown on the con-
tracts and on the surveys and plats. The elements for a 
boundary by acquiescence simply do not exist in this 
case. Respondents respectfully maintain that the trial 
court's decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
.Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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